In 1972 American President Richard Nixon went to China and jumpstarted relations between two Great Powers; states that would shape the world for the remainder of the twentieth century. It was a trip fraught with perceptional challenges, as Nixon and his advisers sought to hedge the United State’s bet that a better relationship with China would lead to more effective containment of an ever adventurous Soviet Union. Despite deeply rooted political obstructionists at home, and embittered allies abroad, the trip was a resounding success insofar as mutual interests came into alignment. Nixon formalized relations, contained a military adversary, and laid the groundwork for a prosperous economic relationship that continues to this day – albeit differences innate to competitive geopolitics.
During the trip Nixon famously turned to his ubiquitous yellow notepad and listed the core issues at play for both sides, listing what the U.S. had to achieve versus the interests of China within the context of any formalized relationship. Nixon and his foreign policy team rightly understood that in negotiation, both sides must be willing to acquiesce; especially if they publically conceded major issues, or did so quietly behind closed doors. No matter the limitations of time and space, there had to be latitude for diplomats to build consensus across the table.
Current negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are at a similar impasse over a potential nuclear weapons program. Much as Nixon shrewdly identified interests that must be secured for both the U.S. and China, so too can President Obama and his team push for a strategic clarity on what each party wants to get done under any arrangement. Diplomacy takes time, yet the end result could yield increasing stability in a tumultuous region, lower energy costs that would spurn economic growth, and better secure long-term interests for both states.
Succinctly, there are two sweeping areas where interests could align on foreign policy goals and domestic priorities. The United States (A) and Iran (B) have additional concerns that must be addressed, yet the following core issues supersede additional desirable interests.
- Avoid escalating conflict in the Persian Gulf.
- (A) Outright war would cause a major disruption on a global energy market already constrained by unprecedented sanctions – a market where supply and demand equals cost. During a period of economic fragility, this equates to catastrophic instability for western economic interests. Washington and its allies have a vital interest in a open market where energy is traded absent crushing sanctions or a disruptive military crisis that could spiral out of control.
- (B) Iran is seeking to establish itself as a respected state on political, economic, and military levels. A more formidable American, Israeli, and Saudi Arabian triumvirate is the last thing Tehran wants to be up against in open conflict – such action would come at a huge cost in blood, treasure, and tarnish its reputation as the dominant power in the region. Conflict would only compound its strategic degradation, leaving it weakened with no chance of victory on any front; therefore Iran can be expected to seek a way out of confrontation.
- Increase supply of energy to the world market.
- (A) Crushing sanctions on Iranian oil removes a major supplier from the world market. This strains allies in key strategic areas around the world; an unnecessary burden which can be alleviated through stable and secure resource management which maximizes global capacity. Washington can lead on this issue for both its interests at home and in support of allies abroad.
- (B) Iran’s economy is dependent on energy. Harsher sanctions and fewer buyers leverages remaining client positions and drives up the cost of business for Tehran. Circumventing sanctions might be possible, but not without significant loss in revenue and compounding inflation that is crushing the domestic economy. These hardships could be avoided through reintegration on the global market; and with a weary population at home it’s quickly becoming a necessity.
This is not an exhaustive list, as the security of regional allies, ongoing state support of terrorism, and assorted unconventional operations all factor into the equation. What these points represent are areas of mutual interest that can be addressed through a combination of transparent international inspections, continued diplomatic engagement, and lifting of economic sanctions. If the U.S. and its allies can bring themselves to accept limited enrichment of below weapons-grade uranium, verifiable by trusted neutral authorities, Iran would be able to maintain regional prestige of “nuclear break out” capability typically, though not exclusively, reserved for Great Powers. Presuming Iran aspires to such lofty recognition, Tehran must remember that with great power comes great responsibility – for statecraft is also an exercise in leadership tempered by the lessons of history.
Michael Miner is a Teaching Fellow at Harvard University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a graduate of Dartmouth College.
Photo: nima; hopographer
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After the Baghdad Talks: Aligning U.S.-Iran Interests
May 25, 2012
In 1972 American President Richard Nixon went to China and jumpstarted relations between two Great Powers; states that would shape the world for the remainder of the twentieth century. It was a trip fraught with perceptional challenges, as Nixon and his advisers sought to hedge the United State’s bet that a better relationship with China would lead to more effective containment of an ever adventurous Soviet Union. Despite deeply rooted political obstructionists at home, and embittered allies abroad, the trip was a resounding success insofar as mutual interests came into alignment. Nixon formalized relations, contained a military adversary, and laid the groundwork for a prosperous economic relationship that continues to this day – albeit differences innate to competitive geopolitics.
During the trip Nixon famously turned to his ubiquitous yellow notepad and listed the core issues at play for both sides, listing what the U.S. had to achieve versus the interests of China within the context of any formalized relationship. Nixon and his foreign policy team rightly understood that in negotiation, both sides must be willing to acquiesce; especially if they publically conceded major issues, or did so quietly behind closed doors. No matter the limitations of time and space, there had to be latitude for diplomats to build consensus across the table.
Current negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are at a similar impasse over a potential nuclear weapons program. Much as Nixon shrewdly identified interests that must be secured for both the U.S. and China, so too can President Obama and his team push for a strategic clarity on what each party wants to get done under any arrangement. Diplomacy takes time, yet the end result could yield increasing stability in a tumultuous region, lower energy costs that would spurn economic growth, and better secure long-term interests for both states.
Succinctly, there are two sweeping areas where interests could align on foreign policy goals and domestic priorities. The United States (A) and Iran (B) have additional concerns that must be addressed, yet the following core issues supersede additional desirable interests.
- Avoid escalating conflict in the Persian Gulf.
- (A) Outright war would cause a major disruption on a global energy market already constrained by unprecedented sanctions – a market where supply and demand equals cost. During a period of economic fragility, this equates to catastrophic instability for western economic interests. Washington and its allies have a vital interest in a open market where energy is traded absent crushing sanctions or a disruptive military crisis that could spiral out of control.
- (B) Iran is seeking to establish itself as a respected state on political, economic, and military levels. A more formidable American, Israeli, and Saudi Arabian triumvirate is the last thing Tehran wants to be up against in open conflict – such action would come at a huge cost in blood, treasure, and tarnish its reputation as the dominant power in the region. Conflict would only compound its strategic degradation, leaving it weakened with no chance of victory on any front; therefore Iran can be expected to seek a way out of confrontation.
- Increase supply of energy to the world market.
- (A) Crushing sanctions on Iranian oil removes a major supplier from the world market. This strains allies in key strategic areas around the world; an unnecessary burden which can be alleviated through stable and secure resource management which maximizes global capacity. Washington can lead on this issue for both its interests at home and in support of allies abroad.
- (B) Iran’s economy is dependent on energy. Harsher sanctions and fewer buyers leverages remaining client positions and drives up the cost of business for Tehran. Circumventing sanctions might be possible, but not without significant loss in revenue and compounding inflation that is crushing the domestic economy. These hardships could be avoided through reintegration on the global market; and with a weary population at home it’s quickly becoming a necessity.
This is not an exhaustive list, as the security of regional allies, ongoing state support of terrorism, and assorted unconventional operations all factor into the equation. What these points represent are areas of mutual interest that can be addressed through a combination of transparent international inspections, continued diplomatic engagement, and lifting of economic sanctions. If the U.S. and its allies can bring themselves to accept limited enrichment of below weapons-grade uranium, verifiable by trusted neutral authorities, Iran would be able to maintain regional prestige of “nuclear break out” capability typically, though not exclusively, reserved for Great Powers. Presuming Iran aspires to such lofty recognition, Tehran must remember that with great power comes great responsibility – for statecraft is also an exercise in leadership tempered by the lessons of history.
Michael Miner is a Teaching Fellow at Harvard University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a graduate of Dartmouth College.
Photo: nima; hopographer
