Is China good for Africa or bad? That seems to be the never-ending debate from international development and investment policy experts and organizations. In much of the western world at least, this conversation frequently involves a mention of how negative and one-sided China’s involvement in the continent has been. After all, their companies built hospitals that had to be torn down after the walls cracked in Angola and roads that were swept away by rain in Zambia. While many of the criticisms of this giant’s interests are valid, demonizing the Chinese involvement fails to consider how the opportunity to wield such power became possible and ignores very similar policies by American allies.
In particular, China has been criticized for a number of “crimes” in Africa. First, select nations argue that the Chinese undermine democracy and good governance—all the West’s hard work—by inking deals with dictators and repressive regimes like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe that abuse their citizen’s human rights. To this, they are also allegedly notorious for contributing to corruption by conducting a large part of business through bribes, not dissimilar to the “dash” in 1960s West Africa. Their approach to markets and labor, or lack thereof, has also caused considerable consternation. By flooding the markets with Chinese products like chicken, the prices have been cut dramatically crippling local sellers. In response, a number of areas have restricted what the Chinese can hawk and where. Another way China has uncut local businesses is by paying their workers a good rate by mainland standards, but this is far below the typical Nigerian’s salary with no real labor laws enforced. Lastly, Chinese disregard for the environment and natural resources is dramatic. While acquiring timber, cooper, platinum and other minerals, their companies have caused significant damage like that caused during the exploration for oil in one of Gabon’s national parks that was stopped in 2006.
Local and national politicians, especially in Southern Africa, have begun to campaign against the “carte blanche” approach to Chinese involvement while emphasizing that their countrymen need to assert more control in the bargaining process. But they, like many others, recognize that the problem they are dealing with is not terribly alien to the aftermath of the Berlin Conference when Africa was partitioned to the colonial powers in 1884 to 1885. Many nations found their feet in the post-independence years at the same time that the United States and the Soviet Union were looking to expand their global reach, fighting a series of nasty proxy wars in Angola and elsewhere. China began to quietly work with a small number of nations as an alternative to the “strings-attached” Cold War powers and developed a long-term strategy by the 1990s to expand its export markets in exchange for aid projects including schools and football stadiums. By the time the first decade of the 21st Century closed, trade between Africa and China was hovering at an astonishing $115 billion. Moving forward, African nations are faced with a strategic choice. They could engage with the Chinese who have a very business-first approach. Or, African leaders can negotiate with the paternal Western nations who will surely continue their prerequisites for aid and lectures on how a proper country should operate; and Africa thought it knew what was best for its people.
Some countries have already begun to make the shift; demanding that China make more equitable deals in order to have access to a country’s resources. Nigeria is the sixth largest exporter of sweet crude oil in the world and yet has one of the most pronounced electricity shortages of any country in Africa. In 2010 Nigeria and a Chinese state firm signed a $23 billion deal to build three refineries and a petrochemical complex in the country. In the partnership China will not only have to access to Nigeria’s vast oil resources, but unlike the deals made over the last few decades with Western oil companies, at least one of these refineries will be used for Nigeria’s own internal goals to get more power to the population. When finished the refineries are expected to add some 750,000 barrels per day capacity in Nigeria. The Nigerian government issued a statement that the deal will “accelerate the construction of new refineries in Nigeria to stem the flood of imported refined products into the country, currently estimated at 10 billion dollars," the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation statement said.
But it is not only Nigeria that is benefitting from a new wave of negotiating Chinese investment. Other African countries, which enjoy close ties to the United States and Europe, are also striking deals with the Chinese. In Kenya and Ethiopia for example, the Chinese have built roads and highways in remote areas that have greatly improved if not completely transformed local economies. In Kenya, for example, the trip between the Samburu area and the nearest urban center Isiolo used to take up to seven hours and could be impassable depending on the weather. Now that same trip on a Chinese highway can take less than two hours. Local villagers working in the urban area are better able to get money and goods home to their families in the rural areas.
Ethiopia, which still primarily receives aid from the United States, has similar infrastructure partnerships with China. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who enjoys a close relationship with the United States, does not apologize for Africa’s increased dealings with China. During last year’s World Economic Forum Zenawi reiterated his position that while most African countries remain close allies of the West politically, the Chinese are filling the continent’s vast infrastructure gap; a gap that needs to be closed in order for Africa to truly develop economically. “When the Chinese companies came in and started building infrastructure in a big way they were filling this major gap in the development of Africa. We, in Africa, should feel very satisfied with it,” he told reporters last May. It is a gap that many African leaders say has not been filled by the West and their long-standing policies on aid and economy, which focus on developing sound democratic institutions before economies can liberalize.
“The official doctrine among the international financial institutions which in the past determined policy in Africa was that infrastructure would be taken care of by the private sector,” said Zenawi. “Well, we have waited 30 years and nothing much has happened,” he said. Perhaps the debate now is not over whether China is good or bad for Africa, but whether Africa's leaders have the strength and power to utilize China to benefit the continent rather than exploit it.
Dana Hughes is a Digital Reporter for ABC News who covered Sub-Saharan Africa for more than four years. Kathryn H. Floyd teaches on international security at the College of William and Mary. She has been researching conflict and consulting on strategic communications over the course of the past decade.
This article was originally published in the July/August edition of the Diplomatic Courier.
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Africa’s Love-Hate Relationship with China
July 31, 2012
Is China good for Africa or bad? That seems to be the never-ending debate from international development and investment policy experts and organizations. In much of the western world at least, this conversation frequently involves a mention of how negative and one-sided China’s involvement in the continent has been. After all, their companies built hospitals that had to be torn down after the walls cracked in Angola and roads that were swept away by rain in Zambia. While many of the criticisms of this giant’s interests are valid, demonizing the Chinese involvement fails to consider how the opportunity to wield such power became possible and ignores very similar policies by American allies.
In particular, China has been criticized for a number of “crimes” in Africa. First, select nations argue that the Chinese undermine democracy and good governance—all the West’s hard work—by inking deals with dictators and repressive regimes like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe that abuse their citizen’s human rights. To this, they are also allegedly notorious for contributing to corruption by conducting a large part of business through bribes, not dissimilar to the “dash” in 1960s West Africa. Their approach to markets and labor, or lack thereof, has also caused considerable consternation. By flooding the markets with Chinese products like chicken, the prices have been cut dramatically crippling local sellers. In response, a number of areas have restricted what the Chinese can hawk and where. Another way China has uncut local businesses is by paying their workers a good rate by mainland standards, but this is far below the typical Nigerian’s salary with no real labor laws enforced. Lastly, Chinese disregard for the environment and natural resources is dramatic. While acquiring timber, cooper, platinum and other minerals, their companies have caused significant damage like that caused during the exploration for oil in one of Gabon’s national parks that was stopped in 2006.
Local and national politicians, especially in Southern Africa, have begun to campaign against the “carte blanche” approach to Chinese involvement while emphasizing that their countrymen need to assert more control in the bargaining process. But they, like many others, recognize that the problem they are dealing with is not terribly alien to the aftermath of the Berlin Conference when Africa was partitioned to the colonial powers in 1884 to 1885. Many nations found their feet in the post-independence years at the same time that the United States and the Soviet Union were looking to expand their global reach, fighting a series of nasty proxy wars in Angola and elsewhere. China began to quietly work with a small number of nations as an alternative to the “strings-attached” Cold War powers and developed a long-term strategy by the 1990s to expand its export markets in exchange for aid projects including schools and football stadiums. By the time the first decade of the 21st Century closed, trade between Africa and China was hovering at an astonishing $115 billion. Moving forward, African nations are faced with a strategic choice. They could engage with the Chinese who have a very business-first approach. Or, African leaders can negotiate with the paternal Western nations who will surely continue their prerequisites for aid and lectures on how a proper country should operate; and Africa thought it knew what was best for its people.
Some countries have already begun to make the shift; demanding that China make more equitable deals in order to have access to a country’s resources. Nigeria is the sixth largest exporter of sweet crude oil in the world and yet has one of the most pronounced electricity shortages of any country in Africa. In 2010 Nigeria and a Chinese state firm signed a $23 billion deal to build three refineries and a petrochemical complex in the country. In the partnership China will not only have to access to Nigeria’s vast oil resources, but unlike the deals made over the last few decades with Western oil companies, at least one of these refineries will be used for Nigeria’s own internal goals to get more power to the population. When finished the refineries are expected to add some 750,000 barrels per day capacity in Nigeria. The Nigerian government issued a statement that the deal will “accelerate the construction of new refineries in Nigeria to stem the flood of imported refined products into the country, currently estimated at 10 billion dollars," the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation statement said.
But it is not only Nigeria that is benefitting from a new wave of negotiating Chinese investment. Other African countries, which enjoy close ties to the United States and Europe, are also striking deals with the Chinese. In Kenya and Ethiopia for example, the Chinese have built roads and highways in remote areas that have greatly improved if not completely transformed local economies. In Kenya, for example, the trip between the Samburu area and the nearest urban center Isiolo used to take up to seven hours and could be impassable depending on the weather. Now that same trip on a Chinese highway can take less than two hours. Local villagers working in the urban area are better able to get money and goods home to their families in the rural areas.
Ethiopia, which still primarily receives aid from the United States, has similar infrastructure partnerships with China. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who enjoys a close relationship with the United States, does not apologize for Africa’s increased dealings with China. During last year’s World Economic Forum Zenawi reiterated his position that while most African countries remain close allies of the West politically, the Chinese are filling the continent’s vast infrastructure gap; a gap that needs to be closed in order for Africa to truly develop economically. “When the Chinese companies came in and started building infrastructure in a big way they were filling this major gap in the development of Africa. We, in Africa, should feel very satisfied with it,” he told reporters last May. It is a gap that many African leaders say has not been filled by the West and their long-standing policies on aid and economy, which focus on developing sound democratic institutions before economies can liberalize.
“The official doctrine among the international financial institutions which in the past determined policy in Africa was that infrastructure would be taken care of by the private sector,” said Zenawi. “Well, we have waited 30 years and nothing much has happened,” he said. Perhaps the debate now is not over whether China is good or bad for Africa, but whether Africa's leaders have the strength and power to utilize China to benefit the continent rather than exploit it.
Dana Hughes is a Digital Reporter for ABC News who covered Sub-Saharan Africa for more than four years. Kathryn H. Floyd teaches on international security at the College of William and Mary. She has been researching conflict and consulting on strategic communications over the course of the past decade.
This article was originally published in the July/August edition of the Diplomatic Courier.
