his analysis expounds on the broad strokes policy recommendations set forth under the premise that U.S. Special Operations must transition from a counter-terror fight to one organized and aligned against peer, and near peer adversaries. In this sequence, the focus is the issue of U.S.-dominated battlespace and its denial by adversaries in a future conflict against which U.S. special operations must prepare for.
Unchallenged for Two Decades
The benefits of the Global War on Terror include the rise of advanced precision guided weapon systems, tailored to high probability of incapacitation with reduced collateral damage risks, a streamlined collection and targeting methodology against sub-societal extremist networks, and the rise of a truly “Joint” force architecture that has fused warfighting capabilities of the service branches to levels heretofore unseen in conflict.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have also systemically built in a dependence on existing support infrastructure, the de facto lifelines linking the collective defense enterprise across the greater Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and into the Hindu Kush. While certain components of special operations warfighting may still be found in austere and remote locales due to targets at the fringes of established battlespace, the preponderance of the operational spectrum continues to function in fixed proximity ‘warm’ bases. These hubs remain deep within dominated air and maritime space, facilitating the rapid deployment of supplies, close air support, and extraction alternatives.
This paradigm is quite unlike the early phases of the war on terror. At that time, logistical planning on a mass scale demanded comprehensive and near-flawless resource management against limited availability. Following that early phase, the subsequent paradigm is systemically induced to rely on the existing support architecture. Adversaries like China have spent decades observing the evolving U.S. modus operandi with a front row view. These rivals understand that the U.S. warfighting machine possesses an induced artificiality in its operations-support infrastructure dependency. It is largely this understanding to which we can attribute Beijing’s encroachment in the South China Sea.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
What the war on terror created was a codified belief that the capability of the U.S. military is predicated on, and beholden to, the ability to control every aspect of the environment in which it operates. The last 18 years have created an insulated zone where the capabilities of the Department of Defense have gone wholly unchallenged in nearly every domain save the information/propaganda spectrum—an area in which the Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS abroad have bested western powers with unparalleled success. Another area to which the U.S. has been unprepared to face challenge is on the electronic warfare spectrum. This is an area in which Russia has increased its capacity dramatically, employing beta systems as early as 2008 in Georgia and fully capable exploitation and denial platforms in Syria in 2018.
While these two areas will be expounded upon in a future analysis (examining emerging domains of warfighting wherein special operations should prepare), they highlight the key point of the present research—the United States has become institutionally handcuffed to the concept of dominated battlespace. This self-induced artificiality creates a strategic vulnerability that the department of defense and its service components are unable to operate under less than ideal conditions.
The special operations enterprise must realize, and prepare for the fact, that it will be required to seize the initiative in the next conflict under precisely those conditions: denied air, sea, land, information—all under constrained or near fully-denied command and control.
What the 18-year conflict has also achieved is strategic stasis, where political credibility was directly tied to the sensationalism of reporting by military commanders—whose very professional survival depended on framing the story to suit the narratives of policy. The Washington Post’s Afghanistan Papers outline in detail how the absence of strategy in the nation's longest running conflict resulted in a failed war. The lack of strategic vision has also ensured the waning social capital by the American public. That societal capital is a critical ingredient when it comes to the warfighting enterprise and will be impossible to muster in a conflict for which we are not effectively postured.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
Picking the Map and the Game Mode
Power rivals, near peer militarized states and antagonists alike will dictate the locales for the next conflict, much like video game lobby moderator choose the multiplayer map despite a player's preference. The intensity of the first phases of confrontation will similarly be beyond the ability of the United States to curb.
Incidents of escalation and confrontation short of conflict, exemplified by Russian incursion into Crimea in 2014 and Georgia in 2008, exist as a direct challenge to the U.S. and its ability to prevent aggressor states from upsetting the established civil order. The tenuous and delicate situation in the Strait of Taiwan, and the persistent overhead threat of violent reunification executed by an authoritarian Beijing, demonstrate another potential escalatory incident that threatens U.S. security posture.
Other states who reside at near peer status (but who may not be labeled ‘rival’ or ‘adversary’)—such as Turkey and its involvement in the proxy war in Libya—are signaling similar challenges to U.S.-led stability endeavors across the globe. In all of these scenarios, the basic components are similar: the environment (physical battlespace) resides at the extent of a U.S.-dominated security bubble, and the catalyst for conflict acceleration is outside the influence of the United States. In short, if the United States fails to adopt a broader partnership initiative, particularly one led by Special Operations, then the SOF enterprise must prepare to engage in future battles in denied space, at a time and place not of our choosing.
Some of the necessary tools for engaging in this denied environment under adversary-directed timelines are already in development. They include the U.S. Army’s Future Vertical Lift for personnel insertion in denied airspace, Extended Range Cannon Artillery for countering adversary offensive fire capabilities, and “Hyper Enabled Operators” providing commercial-inspired information sharing capabilities to warfighters through ruggedized systems. However, the great litmus test of special operations entering these denied environments and effectively rolling back the escalation in conflict cannot be predicated on the newest tech. Indeed, the ability to counter rivals in locals of their choosing, not ours, depends on special operations forces ability to function in the absence of advanced technology.
Similar to the strategic failure in utilizing special operations units as the great panacea for the counter-terror problem, policy makers cannot assume that the SOF enterprise will be situated for directly engaging in a fight with a peer on their soil; nor can it be assumed that equipping special units with the newest tech will enable them to defeat the military components of developed, modernized states. The role of special operations in the future fight must return to its augmenter role—preparing the battlespace for the introduction of mass conventional forces, operating in contested, denied environments, without the benefit of the existing support architecture typified by forces en masse or the counter-terror paradigm. Further, the U.S. special operations response capability must be wholly prepared to function in an autonomous, ‘unplugged’ state; the reliance on technology may spell failure for the U.S. enterprise if its absence means inoperability. But in order to respond to an enemy-dictated environment, low-tech operation thresholds will make the difference.
“Introductory Force”—Posturing Rapid Response
While the ability to operate on the ground in an unplugged state will certainly be a necessity, being postured to arrive at the place of conflict, is a sub-topic equally worthy of exploration. As mentioned, the Future Vertical Lift program addresses some of the present challenges of adversarial ‘bubbles’, or denied zones, but when viewed through the lens of the Pacific distances, no technological advancements in rotary wing technology or littoral combat ships can replace partners who can get specialized fighting units closer to the fight. However, those Future Vertical Lift and littoral assault capabilities will be incredibly important in deterring Chinese and Russian aggression.
To emphasize, the recommendation here is that special operations forces return to the role of supporting and enabling the massed conventional fight. The suggestion of low-tech/denied environment operability for special operations forces is intended to reflect the need to prepare the environment of conflict for the introduction of conventional forces in a state-on-state engagement—without the supremacy advantages inherent in the GWOT construct. The Special Operations enterprise cannot be expected to take on a state military directly and in a sustained manner. Thus, its ability to arrive on scene and prepare the battlespace for the introduction of mass forces is heavily dependent on its ability to start the play clock from as close a proximity as possible.
In short, partnerships matter a great deal when countering rising great powers. Organizing and collectivizing special operations with partners in proximity to flash points like Taiwan, Eastern Europe, and potential crisis zones in the Middle East and North Africa is a means of stemming the potential for escalatory scenarios. By prepositioning special operations forces in a preparatory role with partners abroad, it signals to adversaries and allies alike that the United States is preparing for, and is effectively postured against threats.
a global affairs media network
A Time and Place Not of Our Choosing
July 31, 2020
T
his analysis expounds on the broad strokes policy recommendations set forth under the premise that U.S. Special Operations must transition from a counter-terror fight to one organized and aligned against peer, and near peer adversaries. In this sequence, the focus is the issue of U.S.-dominated battlespace and its denial by adversaries in a future conflict against which U.S. special operations must prepare for.
Unchallenged for Two Decades
The benefits of the Global War on Terror include the rise of advanced precision guided weapon systems, tailored to high probability of incapacitation with reduced collateral damage risks, a streamlined collection and targeting methodology against sub-societal extremist networks, and the rise of a truly “Joint” force architecture that has fused warfighting capabilities of the service branches to levels heretofore unseen in conflict.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have also systemically built in a dependence on existing support infrastructure, the de facto lifelines linking the collective defense enterprise across the greater Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and into the Hindu Kush. While certain components of special operations warfighting may still be found in austere and remote locales due to targets at the fringes of established battlespace, the preponderance of the operational spectrum continues to function in fixed proximity ‘warm’ bases. These hubs remain deep within dominated air and maritime space, facilitating the rapid deployment of supplies, close air support, and extraction alternatives.
This paradigm is quite unlike the early phases of the war on terror. At that time, logistical planning on a mass scale demanded comprehensive and near-flawless resource management against limited availability. Following that early phase, the subsequent paradigm is systemically induced to rely on the existing support architecture. Adversaries like China have spent decades observing the evolving U.S. modus operandi with a front row view. These rivals understand that the U.S. warfighting machine possesses an induced artificiality in its operations-support infrastructure dependency. It is largely this understanding to which we can attribute Beijing’s encroachment in the South China Sea.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
What the war on terror created was a codified belief that the capability of the U.S. military is predicated on, and beholden to, the ability to control every aspect of the environment in which it operates. The last 18 years have created an insulated zone where the capabilities of the Department of Defense have gone wholly unchallenged in nearly every domain save the information/propaganda spectrum—an area in which the Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS abroad have bested western powers with unparalleled success. Another area to which the U.S. has been unprepared to face challenge is on the electronic warfare spectrum. This is an area in which Russia has increased its capacity dramatically, employing beta systems as early as 2008 in Georgia and fully capable exploitation and denial platforms in Syria in 2018.
While these two areas will be expounded upon in a future analysis (examining emerging domains of warfighting wherein special operations should prepare), they highlight the key point of the present research—the United States has become institutionally handcuffed to the concept of dominated battlespace. This self-induced artificiality creates a strategic vulnerability that the department of defense and its service components are unable to operate under less than ideal conditions.
The special operations enterprise must realize, and prepare for the fact, that it will be required to seize the initiative in the next conflict under precisely those conditions: denied air, sea, land, information—all under constrained or near fully-denied command and control.
What the 18-year conflict has also achieved is strategic stasis, where political credibility was directly tied to the sensationalism of reporting by military commanders—whose very professional survival depended on framing the story to suit the narratives of policy. The Washington Post’s Afghanistan Papers outline in detail how the absence of strategy in the nation's longest running conflict resulted in a failed war. The lack of strategic vision has also ensured the waning social capital by the American public. That societal capital is a critical ingredient when it comes to the warfighting enterprise and will be impossible to muster in a conflict for which we are not effectively postured.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
The perception that the U.S. defense infrastructure is incapable of operating beyond the bubble of its supremacy in air-sea-land space, means adversaries have deliberately created their own bubbles (Anti Access, Area Denial methodology) to keep a superior U.S. military beyond its operating range.
Picking the Map and the Game Mode
Power rivals, near peer militarized states and antagonists alike will dictate the locales for the next conflict, much like video game lobby moderator choose the multiplayer map despite a player's preference. The intensity of the first phases of confrontation will similarly be beyond the ability of the United States to curb.
Incidents of escalation and confrontation short of conflict, exemplified by Russian incursion into Crimea in 2014 and Georgia in 2008, exist as a direct challenge to the U.S. and its ability to prevent aggressor states from upsetting the established civil order. The tenuous and delicate situation in the Strait of Taiwan, and the persistent overhead threat of violent reunification executed by an authoritarian Beijing, demonstrate another potential escalatory incident that threatens U.S. security posture.
Other states who reside at near peer status (but who may not be labeled ‘rival’ or ‘adversary’)—such as Turkey and its involvement in the proxy war in Libya—are signaling similar challenges to U.S.-led stability endeavors across the globe. In all of these scenarios, the basic components are similar: the environment (physical battlespace) resides at the extent of a U.S.-dominated security bubble, and the catalyst for conflict acceleration is outside the influence of the United States. In short, if the United States fails to adopt a broader partnership initiative, particularly one led by Special Operations, then the SOF enterprise must prepare to engage in future battles in denied space, at a time and place not of our choosing.
Some of the necessary tools for engaging in this denied environment under adversary-directed timelines are already in development. They include the U.S. Army’s Future Vertical Lift for personnel insertion in denied airspace, Extended Range Cannon Artillery for countering adversary offensive fire capabilities, and “Hyper Enabled Operators” providing commercial-inspired information sharing capabilities to warfighters through ruggedized systems. However, the great litmus test of special operations entering these denied environments and effectively rolling back the escalation in conflict cannot be predicated on the newest tech. Indeed, the ability to counter rivals in locals of their choosing, not ours, depends on special operations forces ability to function in the absence of advanced technology.
Similar to the strategic failure in utilizing special operations units as the great panacea for the counter-terror problem, policy makers cannot assume that the SOF enterprise will be situated for directly engaging in a fight with a peer on their soil; nor can it be assumed that equipping special units with the newest tech will enable them to defeat the military components of developed, modernized states. The role of special operations in the future fight must return to its augmenter role—preparing the battlespace for the introduction of mass conventional forces, operating in contested, denied environments, without the benefit of the existing support architecture typified by forces en masse or the counter-terror paradigm. Further, the U.S. special operations response capability must be wholly prepared to function in an autonomous, ‘unplugged’ state; the reliance on technology may spell failure for the U.S. enterprise if its absence means inoperability. But in order to respond to an enemy-dictated environment, low-tech operation thresholds will make the difference.
“Introductory Force”—Posturing Rapid Response
While the ability to operate on the ground in an unplugged state will certainly be a necessity, being postured to arrive at the place of conflict, is a sub-topic equally worthy of exploration. As mentioned, the Future Vertical Lift program addresses some of the present challenges of adversarial ‘bubbles’, or denied zones, but when viewed through the lens of the Pacific distances, no technological advancements in rotary wing technology or littoral combat ships can replace partners who can get specialized fighting units closer to the fight. However, those Future Vertical Lift and littoral assault capabilities will be incredibly important in deterring Chinese and Russian aggression.
To emphasize, the recommendation here is that special operations forces return to the role of supporting and enabling the massed conventional fight. The suggestion of low-tech/denied environment operability for special operations forces is intended to reflect the need to prepare the environment of conflict for the introduction of conventional forces in a state-on-state engagement—without the supremacy advantages inherent in the GWOT construct. The Special Operations enterprise cannot be expected to take on a state military directly and in a sustained manner. Thus, its ability to arrive on scene and prepare the battlespace for the introduction of mass forces is heavily dependent on its ability to start the play clock from as close a proximity as possible.
In short, partnerships matter a great deal when countering rising great powers. Organizing and collectivizing special operations with partners in proximity to flash points like Taiwan, Eastern Europe, and potential crisis zones in the Middle East and North Africa is a means of stemming the potential for escalatory scenarios. By prepositioning special operations forces in a preparatory role with partners abroad, it signals to adversaries and allies alike that the United States is preparing for, and is effectively postured against threats.
