he international community has entered a new era of great power conflict and the privacy, data, and sensitive information of people across Southeast Asia is primed to become some of the struggle's earliest collateral damage.
The region's middle class is expanding quickly: and with whom it spends its $300 billion of disposable income will significantly affect the U.S. and China's bid for regional primacy. This is why the world's two largest economies have recently been pouring money into the region's digital infrastructure. By reaching into their own deep pockets and encouraging private investment, the U.S and China have developed new communication networks, improved geolocation services, and advanced digital supply chains throughout the region.
Despite the benefits these efforts may provide, they are nonetheless placing the residents of cities like Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok in a precarious position. Although these investments are spurring rapid economic growth among ASEAN member states, they are occurring within a highly fractured regulatory environment that is leaving citizens open to a host of cybersecurity threats from the world's most powerful countries and tech companies. Therefore, ASEAN members ought to adopt stricter internal regulations to protect themselves from these vulnerabilities, while prioritizing support and investment from countries who've demonstrated a more robust commitment to digital security.
Due to the close ties between the Chinese government and its businesses, any investment provided carries security risks. Since its rollout in 2013, China has been undertaking bold projects in the region as a part of its Digital Silk Road initiative. In Southeast Asia already, Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE are building the region's 5G infrastructure while Huawei Marine has completed or is set to build over 30 undersea fiberoptic cable networks. ASEAN member states Thailand, Laos, and Brunei have signed on to the Chinese government's rival to the U.S. controlled GPS—a navigation satellite system named BeiDou-2.
Sensitive data from Southeast Asia's increasingly online individuals, business, and governments are set to flow through these channels leaving China in a position to easily retrieve whatever it desires. These investments give Chinese authorities greater flexibility to collect sensitive data on foreign citizens and political rivals, and steer economic forces in its favor.
The U.S. has not proven itself to be a desirable nor trustworthy alternative. Given that the U.S. spent a considerable part of the twentieth century conducting military interventions and bombing campaigns in some of these countries, painful national memories cause certain Southeast Asian nations to view the U.S. and its motives with skepticism. Indeed, a 2017 survey conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies found that—when asked which country representatives from ASEAN member states felt confident would "do the right thing" to contribute to global peace, security, and prosperity—over 70% of respondents had little to no confidence that either the U.S. or China would.
This wariness is not just a phantom limb of decades-old conflicts. The decision to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership—which would've bolstered the economy of ASEAN members and increased its digital security—further diminished perception of the U.S. as a reliable partner. Failures by Facebook—which plays a tremendously outsized role in the region's internet use—may make ASEAN members even more hesitant about tying their digital futures to U.S. companies. Because Facebook neglected to monitor and address hate speech on its platform, it was used to incite a genocide against Myanmar's Rohingya minority. A data breach then exposed personal information from nearly three million of its users in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
Out of a need to augment their economies, connect their people to the internet, and prepare for the future, ASEAN members have found themselves caught in a struggle between players terribly interested in power and not necessarily in the region's security. It's another reminder that economic gains and connectivity are not without their own set of downsides. States' need to recognize that economic growth outside of a considered and responsible regulatory framework may often come at the expense of other values—sovereignty and privacy chief among them. Until they do, this pattern will likely repeat itself in different places and sectors going forward.
a global affairs media network
A Digital Scramble for Southeast Asia
May 16, 2020
T
he international community has entered a new era of great power conflict and the privacy, data, and sensitive information of people across Southeast Asia is primed to become some of the struggle's earliest collateral damage.
The region's middle class is expanding quickly: and with whom it spends its $300 billion of disposable income will significantly affect the U.S. and China's bid for regional primacy. This is why the world's two largest economies have recently been pouring money into the region's digital infrastructure. By reaching into their own deep pockets and encouraging private investment, the U.S and China have developed new communication networks, improved geolocation services, and advanced digital supply chains throughout the region.
Despite the benefits these efforts may provide, they are nonetheless placing the residents of cities like Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok in a precarious position. Although these investments are spurring rapid economic growth among ASEAN member states, they are occurring within a highly fractured regulatory environment that is leaving citizens open to a host of cybersecurity threats from the world's most powerful countries and tech companies. Therefore, ASEAN members ought to adopt stricter internal regulations to protect themselves from these vulnerabilities, while prioritizing support and investment from countries who've demonstrated a more robust commitment to digital security.
Due to the close ties between the Chinese government and its businesses, any investment provided carries security risks. Since its rollout in 2013, China has been undertaking bold projects in the region as a part of its Digital Silk Road initiative. In Southeast Asia already, Chinese tech giants Huawei and ZTE are building the region's 5G infrastructure while Huawei Marine has completed or is set to build over 30 undersea fiberoptic cable networks. ASEAN member states Thailand, Laos, and Brunei have signed on to the Chinese government's rival to the U.S. controlled GPS—a navigation satellite system named BeiDou-2.
Sensitive data from Southeast Asia's increasingly online individuals, business, and governments are set to flow through these channels leaving China in a position to easily retrieve whatever it desires. These investments give Chinese authorities greater flexibility to collect sensitive data on foreign citizens and political rivals, and steer economic forces in its favor.
The U.S. has not proven itself to be a desirable nor trustworthy alternative. Given that the U.S. spent a considerable part of the twentieth century conducting military interventions and bombing campaigns in some of these countries, painful national memories cause certain Southeast Asian nations to view the U.S. and its motives with skepticism. Indeed, a 2017 survey conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies found that—when asked which country representatives from ASEAN member states felt confident would "do the right thing" to contribute to global peace, security, and prosperity—over 70% of respondents had little to no confidence that either the U.S. or China would.
This wariness is not just a phantom limb of decades-old conflicts. The decision to withdraw from the Transpacific Partnership—which would've bolstered the economy of ASEAN members and increased its digital security—further diminished perception of the U.S. as a reliable partner. Failures by Facebook—which plays a tremendously outsized role in the region's internet use—may make ASEAN members even more hesitant about tying their digital futures to U.S. companies. Because Facebook neglected to monitor and address hate speech on its platform, it was used to incite a genocide against Myanmar's Rohingya minority. A data breach then exposed personal information from nearly three million of its users in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
Out of a need to augment their economies, connect their people to the internet, and prepare for the future, ASEAN members have found themselves caught in a struggle between players terribly interested in power and not necessarily in the region's security. It's another reminder that economic gains and connectivity are not without their own set of downsides. States' need to recognize that economic growth outside of a considered and responsible regulatory framework may often come at the expense of other values—sovereignty and privacy chief among them. Until they do, this pattern will likely repeat itself in different places and sectors going forward.
