.
After garnering at least 15.9 million votes last May 10th, Rodrigo “Rody” Duterte, the popular mayor of Davao City, was elected as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines. He will assume office at noon on June 30, succeeding Benigno Aquino III. Duterte defeated Mar Roxas, Aquino’s preferred successor and the candidate of the ruling Liberal Party, by a margin of more than six million votes.
Hailing from Mindanao, he campaigned as an outsider and an anti-establishment candidate, constantly assailing the alleged failures of the so-called “imperial Manila” in addressing the country’s chronic ills – from stubborn poverty numbers and inefficient public transportation to high crime rates and inept bureaucracy. He is known for his hardline stance against crimes and illicit drugs. Moreover, in the run up to his presidential run announcement, he toured the country to advocate for charter change. He favors a shift to Federalism from the current Unitary system arguing that the “Manila-centric” status quo has not served the Philippines well, and has marginalized a lot of places such as Mindanao. While seen as reform-minded, he has also been accused of employing extra-judicial means for maintaining safety in his city. In the campaign trail, he has cursed the Pope, admitted to past extra-marital affairs, told American and Australian ambassadors to “shut up,” and routinely kissed female supporters. He also indicated that he was a democratic socialist – more of a Bernie Sanders, despite his Trump-like demeanor.
All these have captured the anger and anti-establishment feeling of Filipino voters suffering from the so-called Aquino fatigue. Duterte resonated.
His supporters argued that his policies were almost polar opposites of his public behaviors. They never seemed to mind Duterte’s outrageous statements and demeanor and instead urged detractors to look at his decades of governance experience in Davao. Indeed, his record was not as extreme as he has portrayed himself to be. For instance, he has long been an advocate of gay marriage and indigenous people’s rights. His city has a magna carta for women, and he is pushing to provide greater autonomy for the Muslim minority in the Moro regions of Mindanao.
In the end, he won big. He topped Mar Roxas among men by 22 points and among women by 12 points. He won all age groups, from first time voters to senior citizens. He was also the top pick among Catholics, Muslims, and non-Catholic Christians.
Duterte Foreign Policy Challenges
As Aquino’s successor, Duterte will face a number of significant foreign policy challenges and his responses can be as consequential as permanently losing the country’s territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. In addition to advancing Manila’s “West Philippine Sea” interests, the next president will also have the opportunity to reassess the country’s relationships with its treaty-ally, the U.S., and with its strategic partner, Japan. Moreover, in 2017, the Philippines will chair ASEAN, and will play host to many of the region’s most important summits – ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit. In fact, Duterte will have the honor to be the first Southeast Asian head of state to welcome either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton to an ASEAN meeting.
Needless to say, Duterte’s South China Sea policy is most consequential for the rapidly changing geopolitical and security landscape of East Asia. Will he continue Aquino’s balancing against China threat? Will he revert back to Arroyo-era hedging? Or will he try bandwagoning this time around?
South China Sea at the campaign trail
Answering those questions would require that we find hints from his previous statements, or at least that is what the conventional wisdom would tell us. But considering the personality of the man, it is difficult to arrive at a definitive analysis of what a Duterte Foreign Policy would look like. On the one hand, Duterte’s previous statements seem to indicate that his presidency would be lukewarm towards the Americans, and that he would change the Philippines’ South China Sea approach. For instance, in 2014, he seemed to have indicated that he favored a renegotiation, if not a complete termination, of the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), arguing the deal was one-sided in favor of Washington. Such a move would certainly not sit well with the U.S. Also, a few weeks before the election, he said would be willing to temporarily set aside Manila’s sovereignty claims in favor of joint development with China and more economic aid from Beijing, such as a Chinese-funded railway system in Mindanao. Finally, he was also dismissive of President Aquino’s gradual military buildup, arguing that since the Philippines would never be able to militarily balance China, anyway, military buildup should not be prioritized.
On the other hand, he also stated in the past that if China would not cease from encroaching into Manila’s claimed land features and maritime zones in the South China Sea, he would out rightly favor an unambiguous return of U.S. military bases to the country. During presidential debates, he was also firm in his position that he would not surrender Manila’s rights over the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys, though he was vague at best on what specific policy measures he would pursue to address the issue.
South China Sea, post-election
Notwithstanding his seemingly contradictory statements at the campaign trail, Duterte seemed to have been quite consistent on his policy pronouncements since winning the race. He has indicated that, while he is open to joint exploitation of resources on disputed waters and bilateral talks with Beijing, any discussion on the ultimate resolution of disputes should be multilateral in nature, and should involve the U.S. and Japan.
It all boils down to China threat
In the end, Duterte’s South China Sea policy, just like those of his predecessors, Gloria Arroyo and Aquino, will still likely be determined by the nature of China threat to Manila’s interests, moving forward. Hedging, a policy of employing both limited, non-antagonistic balancing and limited bandwagoning, was pursued by Arroyo mainly because during her time as president, China was not directly threatening the Philippines’ South China Sea interests. Arroyo was able to accommodate some of Beijing’s policy preferences such as joint exploration, while also putting forward counteracting policy of limited balancing, mainly soft-balancing involving the use of regional dialogue institutions and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as safeguards. Meanwhile, Aquino was forced to employ outright balancing as the dominant strategy, mainly because Beijing became very assertive and directly threatened Manila’s interests. Several incidents on the Reed Bank in 2011, the Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012, and the massive land reclamation projects on several features in the Spratlys since 2014 are cases in point.
Policy Expectations
Should a Chinese threat to Philippine interests remain direct, Duterte is expected to balance against it through both military and non-military means. Militarily, Duterte is expected to continue the ongoing modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and would certainly count on the assistance of its treaty-ally, the U.S. On the former, discontinuing the ongoing military buildup would be a mistake, given the country’s three-pronged security challenge – maritime security in the South China Sea, internal security, and natural disasters. He is also likely to even accelerate the implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries. Moreover, given his frank and sometimes undiplomatic demeanor, his first attendance at ASEAN as head of state is certainly most awaited. Nevertheless, he has indicated that while bilateral discussions with China could be pursued, such did not mean an abandonment of Aquino’s multilateralism.
Duterte’s South China Sea policy will be reliant on external opportunities, given Manila’s limited material capability. Certainly, Beijing wants to present itself as an opportunity, rather than a threat. Its envoys had already met Duterte in October 2015 and the Chinese Ambassador to Manila Zhao Jianhua was the first foreign envoy the president-elect met in Davao last May 16. The Japanese Ambassador came in second. U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg has yet to meet Duterte but the latter has already given the former a warning, that his first question would be: “Are you with the Philippines?” Before the election, Duterte had complained of Washington’s questionable commitment to the defense of the Philippines in the South China Sea. Manila is therefore expected to exert more efforts in pressuring Washington to abandon the long-held policy of strategic ambiguity and clearly state America’s treaty obligations for the Philippines in relation to the South China Sea disputes. Washington’s response is consequential, not just in the shaping of Manila’s security strategy, but also in influencing Beijing’s appetite for the use of force. Certainly, Washington’s clarified commitment to the defense of its Southeast Asian treaty-ally would provide the necessary strategic balance in maritime Southeast Asia.
Finally, Washington and Tokyo, the two strategic partners of the Philippines, should be quick to develop consensus and cooperative mechanisms with the new government and should be ready to provide the Duterte Administration with diplomatic, military, and paramilitary assistance it would need in maintaining the status quo in the South China Sea, and in resisting China’s coercive maneuvers on disputed waters.
In sum, despite the seeming uncertainty, Duterte is not likely to bandwagon by accommodating China’s policy preferences. He is also not likely to revert back to hedging, given the nature of threats to the Philippines’ interests. Rather, under the incoming government, Manila is most likely to continue to balance against China threat in the South China Sea.
About the author: Jeffrey Ordaniel is a PhD Candidate at the Security and International Studies Program of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, and a Young Leader with Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu. His research interests include security strategies of secondary states, offshore territorial and maritime entitlement disputes, and the interplay of history, international law, politics and security in East Asian affairs.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
a global affairs media network
Will The Philippines Hedge, Balance, or Bandwagon? Previewing Duterte’s South China Sea Policy
May 20, 2016
After garnering at least 15.9 million votes last May 10th, Rodrigo “Rody” Duterte, the popular mayor of Davao City, was elected as the 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines. He will assume office at noon on June 30, succeeding Benigno Aquino III. Duterte defeated Mar Roxas, Aquino’s preferred successor and the candidate of the ruling Liberal Party, by a margin of more than six million votes.
Hailing from Mindanao, he campaigned as an outsider and an anti-establishment candidate, constantly assailing the alleged failures of the so-called “imperial Manila” in addressing the country’s chronic ills – from stubborn poverty numbers and inefficient public transportation to high crime rates and inept bureaucracy. He is known for his hardline stance against crimes and illicit drugs. Moreover, in the run up to his presidential run announcement, he toured the country to advocate for charter change. He favors a shift to Federalism from the current Unitary system arguing that the “Manila-centric” status quo has not served the Philippines well, and has marginalized a lot of places such as Mindanao. While seen as reform-minded, he has also been accused of employing extra-judicial means for maintaining safety in his city. In the campaign trail, he has cursed the Pope, admitted to past extra-marital affairs, told American and Australian ambassadors to “shut up,” and routinely kissed female supporters. He also indicated that he was a democratic socialist – more of a Bernie Sanders, despite his Trump-like demeanor.
All these have captured the anger and anti-establishment feeling of Filipino voters suffering from the so-called Aquino fatigue. Duterte resonated.
His supporters argued that his policies were almost polar opposites of his public behaviors. They never seemed to mind Duterte’s outrageous statements and demeanor and instead urged detractors to look at his decades of governance experience in Davao. Indeed, his record was not as extreme as he has portrayed himself to be. For instance, he has long been an advocate of gay marriage and indigenous people’s rights. His city has a magna carta for women, and he is pushing to provide greater autonomy for the Muslim minority in the Moro regions of Mindanao.
In the end, he won big. He topped Mar Roxas among men by 22 points and among women by 12 points. He won all age groups, from first time voters to senior citizens. He was also the top pick among Catholics, Muslims, and non-Catholic Christians.
Duterte Foreign Policy Challenges
As Aquino’s successor, Duterte will face a number of significant foreign policy challenges and his responses can be as consequential as permanently losing the country’s territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. In addition to advancing Manila’s “West Philippine Sea” interests, the next president will also have the opportunity to reassess the country’s relationships with its treaty-ally, the U.S., and with its strategic partner, Japan. Moreover, in 2017, the Philippines will chair ASEAN, and will play host to many of the region’s most important summits – ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, and East Asia Summit. In fact, Duterte will have the honor to be the first Southeast Asian head of state to welcome either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton to an ASEAN meeting.
Needless to say, Duterte’s South China Sea policy is most consequential for the rapidly changing geopolitical and security landscape of East Asia. Will he continue Aquino’s balancing against China threat? Will he revert back to Arroyo-era hedging? Or will he try bandwagoning this time around?
South China Sea at the campaign trail
Answering those questions would require that we find hints from his previous statements, or at least that is what the conventional wisdom would tell us. But considering the personality of the man, it is difficult to arrive at a definitive analysis of what a Duterte Foreign Policy would look like. On the one hand, Duterte’s previous statements seem to indicate that his presidency would be lukewarm towards the Americans, and that he would change the Philippines’ South China Sea approach. For instance, in 2014, he seemed to have indicated that he favored a renegotiation, if not a complete termination, of the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), arguing the deal was one-sided in favor of Washington. Such a move would certainly not sit well with the U.S. Also, a few weeks before the election, he said would be willing to temporarily set aside Manila’s sovereignty claims in favor of joint development with China and more economic aid from Beijing, such as a Chinese-funded railway system in Mindanao. Finally, he was also dismissive of President Aquino’s gradual military buildup, arguing that since the Philippines would never be able to militarily balance China, anyway, military buildup should not be prioritized.
On the other hand, he also stated in the past that if China would not cease from encroaching into Manila’s claimed land features and maritime zones in the South China Sea, he would out rightly favor an unambiguous return of U.S. military bases to the country. During presidential debates, he was also firm in his position that he would not surrender Manila’s rights over the Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys, though he was vague at best on what specific policy measures he would pursue to address the issue.
South China Sea, post-election
Notwithstanding his seemingly contradictory statements at the campaign trail, Duterte seemed to have been quite consistent on his policy pronouncements since winning the race. He has indicated that, while he is open to joint exploitation of resources on disputed waters and bilateral talks with Beijing, any discussion on the ultimate resolution of disputes should be multilateral in nature, and should involve the U.S. and Japan.
It all boils down to China threat
In the end, Duterte’s South China Sea policy, just like those of his predecessors, Gloria Arroyo and Aquino, will still likely be determined by the nature of China threat to Manila’s interests, moving forward. Hedging, a policy of employing both limited, non-antagonistic balancing and limited bandwagoning, was pursued by Arroyo mainly because during her time as president, China was not directly threatening the Philippines’ South China Sea interests. Arroyo was able to accommodate some of Beijing’s policy preferences such as joint exploration, while also putting forward counteracting policy of limited balancing, mainly soft-balancing involving the use of regional dialogue institutions and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as safeguards. Meanwhile, Aquino was forced to employ outright balancing as the dominant strategy, mainly because Beijing became very assertive and directly threatened Manila’s interests. Several incidents on the Reed Bank in 2011, the Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012, and the massive land reclamation projects on several features in the Spratlys since 2014 are cases in point.
Policy Expectations
Should a Chinese threat to Philippine interests remain direct, Duterte is expected to balance against it through both military and non-military means. Militarily, Duterte is expected to continue the ongoing modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and would certainly count on the assistance of its treaty-ally, the U.S. On the former, discontinuing the ongoing military buildup would be a mistake, given the country’s three-pronged security challenge – maritime security in the South China Sea, internal security, and natural disasters. He is also likely to even accelerate the implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the two countries. Moreover, given his frank and sometimes undiplomatic demeanor, his first attendance at ASEAN as head of state is certainly most awaited. Nevertheless, he has indicated that while bilateral discussions with China could be pursued, such did not mean an abandonment of Aquino’s multilateralism.
Duterte’s South China Sea policy will be reliant on external opportunities, given Manila’s limited material capability. Certainly, Beijing wants to present itself as an opportunity, rather than a threat. Its envoys had already met Duterte in October 2015 and the Chinese Ambassador to Manila Zhao Jianhua was the first foreign envoy the president-elect met in Davao last May 16. The Japanese Ambassador came in second. U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg has yet to meet Duterte but the latter has already given the former a warning, that his first question would be: “Are you with the Philippines?” Before the election, Duterte had complained of Washington’s questionable commitment to the defense of the Philippines in the South China Sea. Manila is therefore expected to exert more efforts in pressuring Washington to abandon the long-held policy of strategic ambiguity and clearly state America’s treaty obligations for the Philippines in relation to the South China Sea disputes. Washington’s response is consequential, not just in the shaping of Manila’s security strategy, but also in influencing Beijing’s appetite for the use of force. Certainly, Washington’s clarified commitment to the defense of its Southeast Asian treaty-ally would provide the necessary strategic balance in maritime Southeast Asia.
Finally, Washington and Tokyo, the two strategic partners of the Philippines, should be quick to develop consensus and cooperative mechanisms with the new government and should be ready to provide the Duterte Administration with diplomatic, military, and paramilitary assistance it would need in maintaining the status quo in the South China Sea, and in resisting China’s coercive maneuvers on disputed waters.
In sum, despite the seeming uncertainty, Duterte is not likely to bandwagon by accommodating China’s policy preferences. He is also not likely to revert back to hedging, given the nature of threats to the Philippines’ interests. Rather, under the incoming government, Manila is most likely to continue to balance against China threat in the South China Sea.
About the author: Jeffrey Ordaniel is a PhD Candidate at the Security and International Studies Program of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, and a Young Leader with Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu. His research interests include security strategies of secondary states, offshore territorial and maritime entitlement disputes, and the interplay of history, international law, politics and security in East Asian affairs.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
